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Résumé : L’approche la plus influente de la logique des non-existences est
celle provenant de la tradition Frege-Russell. L’un des plus importants dissi-
dents à cette tradition, à ses débuts, était Hugh MacColl. C’est en relation avec
la notion d’existence et avec les arguments impliquant des fictions, que le tra-
vail de MacColl montre une grande différence avec celui de ses contemporains.
En effet, MacColl fut le premier à implémenter dans un système formel l’idée
qu’introduire des fictions dans le domaine de la logique revient à fournir un
langage muni de sous-domaines avec différents types d’objets. Dans cet article,
nous avançons quelques remarques sur la portée de la logique de MacColl sur
les non-existences. Plus précisément, nous suggérons qu’il y a un lien concep-
tuel fort entre la notion de subsistance chez Russell et la notion d’existence
symbolique chez MacColl.
Abstract: The most influential approach to the logic of non-existents is cer-
tainly the one stemming from the Frege-Russell tradition. One of the most im-
portant early dissidents to that tradition was Hugh MacColl. It is in relation
to the notions of existence and arguments involving fictions that MacColl’s
work shows a deep difference from the work of his contemporaries. Indeed,
MacColl was the first to attempt to implement in a formal system the idea
that to introduce fictions in the context of logic amounts to providing a many-
sorted language. The main aim of the paper is to add some brief remarks that
should complete the scope of MacColl’s logic of non-existence. More precisely,
I will suggest that there seems to be a strong conceptual link between Russell’s
notion of subsistence and MacColl’s notion of symbolic existence.
Introduction
The most influential approach to the logic of non-existents is certainly the
one stemming from the Frege-Russell tradition. The main idea is relatively
simple and yet somehow disappointing, to reason with fictions is to reason
with propositions which are either (trivially) true, because with them, on
Philosophia Scientiæ, 15 (1), 2011, 149–162.
150 Shahid Rahman
Russell’s view, we deny the existence of these very fictions, or otherwise they
are (according to Russell) false or (according to Frege) lack truth-value in the
same trivial way. One of the most important early dissidents to that tradition
was Hugh MacColl. 1 It is in regard to the notions of existence and arguments
involving fictions that MacColl’s work shows a deep difference from the for-
mal work of his contemporaries. Indeed, MacColl was the first to attempt
to implement in a formal system the idea that to introduce fictions in the
context of logic amounts to providing a many-sorted language. Interesting
is the relation between Bertrand Russell’s criticisms of Alexius Meinong’s
work and Russell’s discussions with MacColl on existence. Recent scholars
of Meinong such as Rudolph Haller [Haller 1972] and Johan Marek [Marek
2003] and modal Meinongians such as Graham Priest [Priest 2005], Richard
Routley [Routley 1980] and Edward Zalta [Zalta 1988] make the point that
Russell’s Meinong is not Meinong. An interesting historical question is to study
how Russell’s criticism of Meinong in their debates from 1904 to 1920 could
have been influenced by Russell’s discussion with MacColl. Notice that the
main papers on this subject by Russell, Meinong and MacColl, were published
between 1901 and 1905.
MacColl’s work on non-existents resulted from his reaction to one lively
subject of discussion of the 19th century, namely the existential import of
propositions. This topic was related to the traditional question about the
ontological engagement or not of the copula that links subject and predicate
in a judgement. J. S. Mill [Mill 1843] introduced to the discussion the work
of Franz Brentano who published in 1874 his theory on the existential import
of the copula and on how to define away the alleged predicate of existence
[Brentano 1874, chap. 7]. However, most of the British traditional logicians
did not follow Brentano and the opposition between them and the “Booleans”,
who also charged the copula with existential import, triggered a host of papers
on that subject. 2 The early Russell of the Principles and MacColl defended
the idea that there is a real and a symbolic existence, that seems to be close
to Russell’s use of subsistence—a notion that Russell rejects later on, namely,
in his notorious “On denoting” [Russell 1905b]. 3 MacColl’s example, probably
borrowed from Mill, targeted the meaning of the copula “is” in expressions such
as “the non-existent is non-existent”. Unfortunately, the example hinges on the
ambiguity of the copula as identity and as predicative expression. Nevertheless,
MacColl’s development is—though sometimes puzzling—exciting and could be
seen as providing the semantic basis for what nowadays we call free logic.
1. For an overview of MacColl contributions to logic, see [Rahman & Redmond
2008]. Most of MacColl’s logical writings, including his 1906 book, are collected and
reprinted in [Rahman & Redmond 2007].
2. [Land 1876] spelled out the position of the traditionalists and triggered the
discussions in Mind on the existential import of propositions.
3. For a thorough discussion of Russell’s grounds for rejecting his early endorse-
ment of Meinong’s theory of objects, see [Farrell Smith 1985].
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MacColl’s Logic of Non-Existence
MacColl’s logic of non-existence is based on a two-fold ontology and one
domain of quantification, namely:
– The class of existents – MacColl calls them reals:
Let e1, e2, e3, etc. (up to any number of individuals men-
tioned in our argument or investigation) denote our universe
of real existences. [MacColl 1905a, 74]
[T]hese are the class of individuals which, in the given cir-
cumstances, have a real existence. [MacColl 1906, 42]
– The class of non-existents:
Let 01, 02, 03, etc., denote our universe of non-existences, that
is to say, of unrealities, such as centaurs, nectar, ambrosia,
fairies, with self-contradictions, such as round squares, square
circles, flat spheres, etc., including, I fear, the non-Euclidean
geometry of four dimensions and other hyperspatial geome-
tries. [MacColl 1905a, 74]
[T]he class of individuals which, in the given circumstances,
have not a real existence [. . . ] It does not exist really,
though (like everything else named), it exists symbolically.
[MacColl 1906, 42]
In no case, however, in fixing the limits of the class e,
must the context or given circumstances be overlooked.
[MacColl 1906, 43]
– And the domain of quantification, the Universe of discourse, containing
the two preceding classes:
Finally, let S1, S2, S3, etc., denote our Symbolic Universe, or
“Universe of Discourse”, composed of all things real or unreal
that are named or expressed by words or other symbols in
our argument or investigation. [MacColl 1905a, 74]
As expected, individuals, that are elements of the Universe of discourse, might
be elements of the first two classes:
We may sum up briefly as follows: Firstly, when any symbol A
denotes an individual ; then any intelligible statement φ(A), con-
taining the symbol A, implies that the individual represented by A
has a symbolic existence; but whether the statement φ(A) implies
that the individual represented by A has real existence depends
upon the context. [MacColl 1905a, 77]
Moreover, predicates might be interpreted by the means of classes containing
reals, unreals or both of them:
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Secondly, when any symbol A denotes a class, then, any intelli-
gible statement φ(A) containing the symbol A implies that the
whole class A has a symbolic existence; but whether the state-
ment φ(A) implies that the class A is wholly real, or wholly un-
real, or partly real and partly unreal, depends upon the context.
[MacColl 1906, 77]
When the members A1, A2, &c.; of any class A consist wholly of
realities, or wholly of unrealities, the class A is said to be a pure
class; when A contains at least one reality and also at least one
unreality, it is called a mixed class. [MacColl 1906, 43]
Notice that MacColl actually speaks of the existence of the class. I think
that we should understand it as talking about the existence of the elements of
the class (see below on his rejection of interpreting hunger independently of a
hungry person).
Let us read MacColl’s own words on the symbolic universe more closely.
On one hand it sounds as we might do logic in such a universe abstracting
away whether objects are or not existent. On the other hand, MacColl, in his
reply to Russell 4 and to Arthur Thomas Shearman, insists that the distinction
between existent and non-existents within the symbolic universe is crucial for
his logic:
The explanation from my point of view is, that the confusion
is solely on their side [Shearman’s and other symbolists’ side],
and that it arises from the fact that they (like myself formerly)
make no symbolic distinction between realities and unrealities [. . . ]
With them, ‘existence’ means simply existence in the Universe
of Discourse, whether the individuals composing that universe
be real or unreal [. . . ] Once anything (real or unreal) is spo-
ken of, it must, from that fact alone, belong to the Symbolic
Universe S, though not necessarily to the universe of realities e.
[MacColl 1905b, 579]
With some hindsight, we might add two kinds of existential quantifications or
at least two kinds of existential statements, namely:
– One kind of existential statements has as scope the whole symbolic uni-
verse. In other words, it is about quantification over all the objects
of the domain, realities and unrealities. In this sense, everything (in
the universe of discourse) exists at least symbolically. Now, MacColl’s
reading of this kind of quantification that ranges over all the domain is
not really congenial to Meinongianism, since the analogous Meinongians
quantifiers have a reading of sentences such as There are lots of things
which do not exist, in which the objects in the range of the quantifier do
4. “This sense of existence [the meaning in which we enquire whether God exists]
lies wholly outside Symbolic Logic, which does not care a pin whether its entities
exist in this sense or not” [Russell 1905a, 398].
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not exist. 5 MacColl’s notion of existence seems to be closer to that of the
early Russell than to that of Meinong. Indeed, Meinong had also three
ontological domains: (i) the domain of existents—signified by the verb
Existieren, e.g. concrete objects in space time; (ii) the domain of subsis-
tents such as abstract objects, e.g. propositions, events—which do not
exist but have the kind of being Meinong called Bestehen; (iii) the do-
main of non-existent objects which possess no being of any kind, such as
chimeras and other fictional entities. However, Meinong’s notion of non-
existence excluded any kind of being, even subsistence, while MacColl’s
symbolic existence and Russell’s version of subsistence included existents
and non-existents. In fact, MacColl and (the early) Russell think that
even non-existents have a kind of being—that the later Russell calls (in-
appropriately) subsistence and MacColl symbolic existence. Compare,
e.g., once more MacColl’s 1902 remark:
Take, for example, the proposition “Non-existences are
non-existent”. This is a self-evident truism; can we af-
firm that it implies the existence of its subject non-
existences? [. . . ] In pure logic the subject, being always
a statement, must exist—that is, it must exist as a state-
ment. [MacColl 1902, 356]
with the Russell of the Principles:
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any
true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a
term [. . . E]very term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A
man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera,
or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term.
[Russell 1903, 43]
MacColl and Russell make the point that everything named must have
some kind of being. This point of theirs might be seen as an ontologically
charged reading of Aristotle’s remark:
Even non-existents can be signified by a name. [Aristotle
1989, 199]
Probably because of this doctrine Russell reduced Meinong’s domain
(iii) to the domain (ii). Thus, when Russell ascribed being to Meinong’s
non-existents (round-squares, golden mountains), sometimes tacitly in
the 1905-1907 period and later explicitly in 1918, and 1943, he was
missing a crucial distinction in Meinong. It is striking that Russell’s re-
duction of Meinong’s ontology is already pre-figured in MacColl’s notion
of symbolic existence.
Notice that, according to the quotations above, one of MacColl’s points
about the use of symbolic existence is that it allows the drawing of
inferences by the use of the rule nowadays known as particularization.
E.g. Derive:
5. This point has been stressed—and rightly so—by an anonymous referee.
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“Something is (symbolically) non-existent”,
from:
“Joseph Cartaphilus is (symbolically) non-existent”.
Perhaps the following paraphrase, though awkward, might be closer to
MacColl’s own analysis:
“The non-existent Joseph Cartaphilus exists symbolically”.
Hence,
“Something non-existent exists symbolically”.
There might be also some room to think dynamically about the inter-
action between symbolic and real existence. The real existence might
come into play once the precise constitution of the universe of discourse
has been specified. Juan Redmond and Mathieu Fontaine are develop-
ing a dialogic that does justice to this dynamics from an epistemic point
of view: symbolic existence will be assumed so long as we do not know
about the ontological constitution of our universe of discourse. 6 I shall
not be discussing this approach here.
– The second kind of existential statement ranges over the domain of reali-
ties. Accordingly, the following use of particularization yields a non-valid
inference:
“Joseph Cartaphilus is (symbolically) non-existent”.
Hence,
“Something is really non-existent”
(“Something non-existent really exists”).
Certainly, formulations such as “the non-existent Joseph Cartaphilus ex-
ists symbolically” mentioned above sound strange and motivated, later on,
Russell’s rejection of the approach and the very well known criticism of Quine
[Quine 1948]. If we think this in the context of two different sorts of particular
and universal statements (implemented with the help of two kinds of quanti-
fiers), and we liberate the symbolical pair of any ontological commitment then
MacColl’s proposal is as plausible as modern Meinongian interpretation of pos-
itive free-logic is. 7 Now, this reading of such a kind of quantified expressions
free of any ontological commitment is not really congenial with MacColl’s ap-
proach. On my view, as I will suggest below, it is possible to defend the very
notion of symbolic existence in a more congenial way, though, unfortunately,
this goes far beyond MacColl’s own formal and conceptual framework.
6. Cf. [Fontaine & Rahman 2010], [Fontaine, Redmond & Rahman 2011].
7. Meinongian positive free logic allows singular terms of the language to refer to
non-existent objects. The domain might contain existent and non-existent elements.
The result is that the identity axiom holds in any such logic extended with equality.
That is, there might be identity of non-existent objects. Furthermore, in positive free
logic we might introduce two pairs of quantifiers: ontologically committed quantifiers
and ontologically not committed quantifiers. Cf. [Bencivenga 1983], [Lambert 1997].
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A different source of puzzlement might relate to ontological questions.
What are those objects that are non-existent? Did MacColl come to a con-
ception close to some kind of realism that, despite the differences discussed
above, shares some metaphysical tenets with Meinongianism? Some arguments
in favour of an affirmative answer are the following:
1. MacColl’s two notions of existence (the real and the symbolic existence)
seem to have been conceived of as predicates. Indeed, in MacColl’s
notation existence, when applied to an individual or to (the members
of a) class, is signified by an exponential. Now, in general, leaving to
one side the many changes and hesitations of his notational system,
exponentials are used in principle to express a predicative role. In fact,
the basic expressions of MacColl’s formal language are expressions of
the form:
HB
where H is the domain and B a predicate. For instance:
H : the domain of horses
B: brown
HB: The horse is brown: all of the elements of H (horses)
are brown.
The same can be said of the use of the predicates of symbolic, real
existence and non-existence:
He: The horse is real or has a real existence: all of the
elements of H (horses) are really existent. H0: The horse
is an unreality: all of the elements of H (horses) are not
really existent. HS: The horse has a symbolic existence: all
of the elements of H (horses) are symbolically existent.
2. Recall that according to Meinong we should distinguish the Sein of
objects—their existential status—from their Sosein, their having—
certain—features or properties. Thus, Meinongians claim that an object
can have a set of properties even if it does not exist. This is the so-called
Principle of independence: Pegasus, Ulysses, and Joseph Cartaphilus
can be said to have properties without the propositions involved becom-
ing false. MacColl’s ontological approach seems to assume such a prin-
ciple. However, MacColl’s notion of symbolic existence (and Russell’s
subsistence), that, as mentioned above, assumes a kind of being, even
for non-existents, waters down Meinong’s principle of independence.
Now, endorsement of the principle of independence pushes one towards
the thesis that any singular term denotes an object, existent or not.
This holds in particular for (definite and indefinite) descriptions, that
is, noun phrases of the form “the/an object with such-and-such prop-
erties”. We therefore have what we may call, following [Parsons 1980],
and by analogy with the principle of comprehension in naïve set theory,
an Unrestricted Characterization Principle (UCP) for objects. The idea
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behind UCP is that we specify an object via a given set of properties,
such as (1) is a horse, is ridden by Don Quijote, (2) has a philosoph-
ical discussion with Sancho Panza’s donkey, (n). Take the conjunc-
tion of the relevant predicates expressing all of the relevant properties
(1), (2) . . . (n), then, according to UCP, an object is described by pre-
cisely this conjunction, namely the one called Rocinante by Cervantes.
In his mature work, Russell raised deep objections 8 against two of the
main features of UCP:
(i) Can we deploy UCP to describe objects with contradictory prop-
erties? So far nothing prevents using UCP in this way.
(ii) Can we deploy UCP to produce some kind of ontological argument
for anything whatever? Indeed nothing prevents us from doing
so if we combine it with the fact that existence is taken to be
a property. Take the properties of being a Cyclops, having one
eye, being son of Poseidon and being existent. If we apply UCP,
we have that an object called Polyphem has all the properties
mentioned above including that of existence.
What about MacColl? In relation to contradictions, MacColl does not
seem to be scared off by them: they are denizens of their own domain.
It is not easy to see what the logic will be. Presumably the following is
a valid inference in MacColl’s system:
“This round square is (symbolically) round and square”.
Hence,
“Something is (symbolically) round and square”.
Nowadays we might embed this kind of inference in a paraconsistent
framework. 9
Does MacColl endorse some form of characterization principle? In fact
it rather looks that MacColl would like to use a restricted form of the
characterization principle. The classes of reals and unreals are disjoint
classes and thus the corresponding predicates being real and being un-
real—in contrast with other predicates such as being round and being
square—cannot be predicated at the same time of the same object. The
modern reader might invoke the distinction between nuclear and non-
nuclear properties. 10
8. Cf. [Farrell Smith 1985, 313–319].
9. A logic is said to be paraconsistent if not every contradiction entails triviality.
Cf. [Routley & Meyer 1976], [Heintz 1979].
10. Meinong’s student, Ernst Mally (1879-1944) suggested distinguishing, what
have been later called, nuclear from non-nuclear properties. Nuclear properties are
those that allow safe uses of the comprehension principle (not any more unrestrict-
edly). When applied to fictional characters, this device is deployed to assert that they
have all those nuclear properties that the relevant story attributes to them. [Parsons
1980] comes to the following list: Nuclear predicates (“is blue”, “is tall”, “is golden”, “is
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3. MacColl’s approach and Meinongianism (including Russell’s early
Meinongianism) share the same unease about created objects. Indeed,
since both MacColl and Meinongians assume that objects are always
there, though they do not exist, they thus cannot be said to have been
created. Accordingly, they are non-existents, and the creation of a fic-
tional character cannot mean that it has been brought into existence (in
the strong ontologically loaded sense).
4. MacColl provides some examples of the intentional application of his
logic of non-existents [MacColl 1905a, 77–78], such as:
“The man whom you see in the garden is really a bear.”
“The man whom you [thought to] see in the garden is not a
bear.”
MacColl takes the point of view of an observer, who asserts the above
propositions and studies what happens with the ontological assumption
implied by them. MacColl concludes that the ontological status of the
individual man is that of not-existent in the first example and existent
in the second.
There also are some very brief remarks on the ontological status of ab-
stract objects, such as hardness, thoughts and feelings:
There can be no hunger without a hungry person or animal;
there can be no hardness without some hard substance [. . . ].
Similarly, I cannot conceive of a thought apart from a thinker,
or of a feeling or sensation without a soul or feeler. [MacColl
1910, 349–350]
Unfortunately, MacColl does not develop an explicit theory of intention-
ality or intentional objects nor does he systematically link those remarks
to his ontological framework.
Nevertheless, as suggested by Juan Redmond [Redmond 2010, chap. 6],
this might provide a basis for his concept of symbolic existence. Indeed,
take the domain of unreals as the domain of ontologically dependent
objects (roughly, in the same sense that a thought is ontologically de-
pendent upon a thinker and a fictional character upon a copy of the
book that describes it), the domain of reals as the domain of ontolog-
ically independent objects, then symbolic existence can be defined as
the domain that contains both, ontologically dependent and ontologi-
cally independent objects. 11 Certainly this goes far beyond MacColl’s
a mountain”, etc.); and Non-nuclear predicates: Ontological (“exists”, “is mythical”,
“is fictional”, etc.), Modal (“is possible”, “is impossible”, etc.), Intentional (“is thought
about by Meinong”, “is worshipped by someone”, etc.), and Technical (“is complete”,
“is consistent”, etc.). The nuclear/non-nuclear distinction is formally characterized in
[Jacquette 2009, section 5.1]. Unfortunately the precise content of the lists is difficult
to establish. Priest suggests a way out that allows the unrestricted version of the
comprehension principle [Priest 2005, 82–85].
11. The key to this approach to fictional objects lies in acknowledging them a
full ontological status—considering them as denizens of our world like armchairs,
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own developments since he lacked both the notion of quantifier and a
thorough study of the notion of intentional object.
Conclusion
The main aim of the paper is historical, namely the relation between
MacColl’s theory of non-existents and Russell’s early endorsement and later
criticism of Meinong. To state this clearly, though MacColl was aware of the
discussions that took place in the British milieu on the existential import of
propositions, triggered by the work of Brentano and Meinong, it is doubtful
that MacColl ever read these authors. However, while reading MacColl’s ap-
proach to this issue it is tempting to understand Russell’s version of Meinong’s
notion of subsistence as an adaptation of MacColl’s symbolic existence to the
Meinongian framework—a misleading understanding of Meinong, some might
say. Another, less contentious, way to see the emergence of the notions of sym-
bolic existence and subsistence is to understand both concepts as the result
of an interaction of MacColl with Russell and other members of the British
logical community of those days on the existential import of propositions. In
relation to the emergence of these notions, I hope the paper will motivate
further and wider historical studies. 12 More generally, in this context we can
understand MacColl’s conceptions as the exploration of new territories in the
philosophy of logic, despite the fact that he hadn’t the right instruments to
develop such incursions more thoroughly. Those attempts, in their time, not
only announced a new refreshing wind in philosophy of logic but also aimed to
take up anew the old philosophical tradition. I am certainly happy to acknowl-
edge my respect for his brave insights, here, at the northern part of France
that offered him a second home.
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elephants or galaxies. On the one hand, fictional objects are artifacts like tables or
buildings. On the other hand, they are abstract creations like marriages, universities
and theoretical entities postulated by physical theories. Fictional objects are tied to
the everyday world by their dependence on readers, authors and copies of texts. Cf.
[Thomasson 1999].
12. See, in this volume, F. F. Abeles and A. Moktefi’s paper on MacColl’s exchanges
with Lewis Carroll, notably on the notion of existence.
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